108 200. Therefore, ‘individualised, principled sentencing’ – based on both the crime and criminal, with consideration of whether reform or rehabilitation is achievable (held to be ‘probable’ in Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik), and consequently whether the option of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed – should be the only factor of ‘commonality’ that must be discernible from decisions relating to capital offences. With the creation of a new sentencing threshold in Swamy Shraddananda (2)107, and later affirmed by a constitution bench in Union of India v. V Sriharan108, of life imprisonment without statutory remission (i.e., Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution are still applicable), yet another option exists, before imposition of death sentence. However, serious concern has been raised against this concept, as it was upheld by a narrow majority, and is left to be considered at an appropriate time. Theories of punishment 201. The 262nd Report, speaks extensively to the penological justification of the death penalty. It finds that there is inconclusive evidence that this form of punishment has more of a deterrent effect, in comparison to life imprisonment. Dismissing the retributive theory of punishment on the ground that it suffers from lack of guidance on quantifying the punishment that would be appropriate to impose, it categorically states that: “Capital punishment fails to achieve any constitutionally valid penological goals….In focusing on death penalty as the ultimate measure of justice to victims, the restorative and rehabilitative aspects of justice are lost sight of. Reliance on the death penalty diverts attention from other problems ailing the criminal justice system such as poor investigation, crime prevention and rights of victims of crime.” 202. While the 262nd Report recommends abolition of the death penalty on this ground, in addition to sentencing having become judge-centric or arbitrary, it has not prompted Parliamentary intervention. Whether the death penalty deserves a relook (as recommended by J. Kurian Joseph (dissenting) in 107 Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767 108 (2016) 7 SCC 1