466 Malayan Law Journal [2010] 4 MLJ The evidence upon which the public prosecutor relies in support of his appeal is as follows. First, the nature of the injuries suffered by the deceased. These are such as to point to an intention to kill on the part of those who inflicted them. Second, the other evidence which the public prosecutor says irresistibly points to the first accused and the fourth child as being the assailants who inflicted the wounds on the deceased. In the first place, there is evidence that the first accused and the fourth child purchased two parangs from PW5 and PW6. One of the parangs is exh P22. In the second place, there is the evidence of PW17 and PW18. In a gist, this is what the two witnesses said. At a little past midnight, PW18 received a telephone call on his mobile from the fourth child asking to be picked up from a Shell petrol station at USJ. PW17 and PW18 went along. On arrival, the first accused and the fourth child emerged from the petrol station and entered the car. PW19 was driving it. Both PW17 and PW18 noticed that the clothing of the first accused and the fourth child was blood stained. Also, the fourth child appeared to be in a state of shock. While in the car, the fourth child informed PW17 and PW18 that he and the first accused had hit someone’s father. All those in the car then proceeded to PW17’s home where the fourth child had a shower and changed his clothes. PW17 then asked him what had happened. In response, the fourth child said that he and the first accused had killed someone but with no intention to cause death. These statements, submits the learned deputy who argued the appeal before us are admissible as admissions under s 21 of the Evidence Act 1950. In the third place, there is the blood stained clothing later recovered by the police during investigation which carried the blood of the deceased as established by DNA testing. A similar test was conducted on the blood stain found on exh P22 which established that that weapon carried the deceased’s blood. In the fourth place, there is evidence showing that the police party who arrived at the scene of the crime had used a tracker dog which had led them from the deceased’s house to the very Shell station where PW17 and PW18 had picked up the first accused and the fourth child. Lastly, there is evidence to show that the first accused was seen in the compound of the deceased’s house at about the time the crime was committed. [55] In Udaipal Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1972 SC 54; (1972) 4 SCC 142, the Supreme Court observed: (xxi) In cases where only circumstantial evidence is available at the outset one normally starts looking for motive and the opportunity to commit the crime. If the evidence shows that the accused having a strong enough motive had the opportunity of committing the crime and the established circumstances on the record considered along with explanation, if any, of the accused exclude the reasonable possibility of anyone else being the real culprit then the chain of evidence can be considered to be so complete so as to show that within all human probability, the crime must have been committed by the accused. He may in that event, safely be held guilty on such circumstantial evidence. A B C D E F G H I