[2010] 4 MLJ A B C D E F G Low Kian Boon & Anor v Public Prosecutor (Heliliah FCJ) 451 In the evaluation of the evidence of the second appellant (Vol 2(8) p 2779–2792) the HC judge stated, inter alia: The evidence, that he changed his T-shirt after the bath, and that blood stains were seen on his shirt when he entered the car at the petrol station, must irrefutably suggest that the fourth child was most certainly inside the house of the deceased, at the time the deceased was attacked or soon thereafter. His evidence, that he was dropped off at the Shell petrol station, and that he was waiting at the petrol station for the arrival of Ivan and Jimmy with their respective girlfriend, is definitely a blatant lie. His evidence, that the police had seized a shirt in his house on 13 November 2003, is clearly a lie, too, because the police had not produced any shirt in court seized from his house. His attempt to create doubts that the T-shirt worn by him on the day of the incident had any blood stains, because the police did not produce it, is misconceived, and has failed totally to enhance his defence. The fact that his own counsel had suggested to SP17, in cross-examination, that the fourth child had changed his shirt inside the car and not at SP17’s house, flies in the face of the defence of the fourth child. [30] The HC’s decision as affirmed by the COA are primarily attained on the acceptance of the evidence of several of prosecution witnesses. Their evidence have been assailed on various instances by the counsel for the appellants. On this aspect I need to cite what has been considered by this very court in Parlan bin Dadeh v Public Prosecutor [2008] 6 MLJ 19 at pp 49–50; [2009] 1 CLJ 717 at p 753: Learned counsel did not argue that the findings of fact of the learned judge on Bob and Murhaban bin Umar must be reviewed. His submissions is anchored on the premise that the defence evidence on Bob and Murhaban bin Umar is true and must therefore be accepted. This will amount to this court being required to make its own findings of fact. It is settled law that this is no part of the function of an appellate court. The making of a finding of fact is a function exclusively reserved by the law to the trial court (see Public Prosecutor v Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2005] 6 MLJ 393; [2006] 1 CLJ 457). What an appellate court can do is to review findings of fact made by a trial court in accordance with principles which are well settled. In this regard reference may be made to Herchun Singh & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1969] 2 MLJ 209 where Ong Hock Thye CJ said at p 211: H An appellate court should be slow in disturbing such finding of fact arrived at by the judge, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witness, unless there are substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding: see Sheo Swarup v King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227. I In Ye Wei Gen v Public Prosecutor [1999] 4 SLR 101 Yong Pung How CJ said at pp 107–108: It is trite law that an appellate court will be slow to overturn the trial judge’s finding of fact unless it can be shown that his decision was plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence before him: Tan Chow Soo v Ratna Ammal