[2016] 2 MLJ A B C D E F G H I Abuchi Ngwoke v Public Prosecutor (Kamardin Hashim JCA) 633 agreed with learned counsel’s submission that there was no evidence as to what was the analysis conducted by SP3 before she came to her conclusion. [22] In Leong Bon Huat v Public Prosecutor [1993] 3 MLJ 11, on the same issue regarding infirmities in chemist testimony, Edgar Joseph Jr SCJ decided that: It is true that the chemist did say that he had conducted a physical examination of the whole of the plant material, by which, we suppose, he meant a visual examination, aided no doubt by microscope. But while the result of such an examination might well establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the plant material was cannabis within the meaning of s 2 of the Act it was necessary to take the matter further and establish beyond any reasonable doubt that was so. This further step would, of necessity, have involved the carrying out of chemical tests on adequate quantities of the plant material. What would be adequate quantities for this purpose would depend on the particular circumstances of each case and we do not consider that any useful purpose would be served by laying down any mathematical formula. Suffice it to say, that in the present case, we were not satisfied that the samples of plant material upon which the chemist had carried out the chemical tests were adequate, having regard to the total weight of the plant material, for the reasons stated. We note that in the Singapore case of Public Prosecutor v Ang Soon Huat [1991] 1 MLJ 1, where one of the contentions advanced by counsel for the accused was similar to that advanced in the present appeal, and where the contention was upheld, the court having reminded itself of the criminal standard of proof, had concluded that where the court was left in doubt as to whether the accused has committed an offence in a lower or higher degree of seriousness, the court should make a finding in the lower degree, particularly where a finding in a higher degree will give rise to a mandatory sentence of death. The result, therefore, was that so far as the charge of trafficking in cannabis in contravention of s 39B was concerned, ‘the case against the appellant was not proved with that certainty which is necessary in order to justify a verdict of guilty.’ (Per Lord Hewart CJ in R v Wallace 23 Cr App Rep 32 applied by Thomson CJ in Jubri v Public Prosecutor [1962] MLJ 34.) Accordingly, we have no option but to allow the appeal, to quash the conviction for trafficking in cannabis, to set aside the sentence, and to substitute in lieu thereof, a conviction for possession of cannabis in contravention of s 39A of the Act and a sentence of life imprisonment to take effect from the date of arrest, with the mandatory ten strokes of the rotan. [23] In the instant appeal before us, in view of the infirmities in the testimony of the chemist, we echoed what was said by His Lordship Edgar Joseph Jr SCJ in the above quoted case that the charge of trafficking was not proved with that certainty.