[2010] 3 MLRA Balamurali Muthusamy v. PP 681 iii. his acts caused the serious injury which led to the death; and iv. he had no reason for doing what he did. [18] At p. 208 of the record of appeal, to confirm that he was not unmindful of the legal requirement that the injury in all probability would cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the learned judge wrote: Seksyen 300(d) Kanun Keseksaan ini boleh digunakan apabila seseorang yang dituduh itu tidak mempunyai niat tertentu untuk menyebabkan kematian atau kecederaan ke atas seseorang yang khusus, tetapi ia merangkumi perbuatan seseorang yang dituduh yang beliau mengetahui amat berbahaya dan perbuatan itu beliau mengetahui boleh menyebabkan kematian atau kecederaan yang mungkin menyebabkan kematian. ... Berdasarkan kepada alasan-alasan di atas saya berpuashati bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kesemua unsur di bawah seksyen 300(d) Kanun Keseksaan di tahap melampaui keraguan munasabah terhadap kedua-dua pertuduhan. [19] Based on our perusal of the grounds of judgment and finding we had no hesitation in dismissing the supplementary argument of learned counsel that the learned judge had failed to consider the ingredient of "act in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as likely to cause death." [20] Whether by design or not, learned counsel before us left the defence of being intoxicated untouched. In substitute he canvassed that since limb s. 300(d) was alluded to by the learned judge, by no account could the learned judge have found that the appellant knew his acts were imminently dangerous, and would cause the deaths (Kalegura Padma Rao & Anor v. The State of A.P(AIR [2007]1299). We accept that this limb requires knowledge on the part of the appellant ie, a subjective requirement, that he knows that his acts were so imminently dangerous that they must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. [21] In no uncertain terms learned counsel submitted that the appellant had merely wanted to commit suicide and had no idea that his acts were imminently dangerous and would in all probability cause death. Further to that, the two deceased persons had come onto the scene when he was in the midst of setting himself on fire, and they had attempted to stop him from so doing. As starters, we found the suggestion of learned counsel that the appellant would not know the effect of his actions as dangerous, absurd and unacceptable. It was his very own case that the appellant wanted to commit suicide, let alone his mode of suicide was by engulfing himself with fire. In a word it was a self-defeating argument. If the appellant knew that drenching himself with petrol and igniting the lighter would