704 Krishna Rao Gurumurthi & Anor v. PP & Another Appeal [2007] 1 MLRA To determine the extent to which the two sets of information can be admitted into evidence one has to fall back to the principle in Chong Soon Koy, to ask the two questions formulated therein by Suffian LP: (a) What was the fact discovered? (b) What was the information supplied by the accused relating distinctly to the facts thereby discovered ? In respect of the first accused, the fact discovered embraces the place from where the body was discovered and his knowledge about it, and the information supplied that relates distinctly to the facts discovered was that he had thrown it there. In respect of the second accused, it embraces the place from where the jewellery was discovered and his knowledge of it and the information supplied that relates distinctly to the facts was that he had hidden it there. [31] We find the approach of the learned judge on this part of the case to be in accordance with the principles laid down by the former Federal Court in Chong Soon Koy v. Public Prosecutor [1977] 1 MLRA 213 ; [1977] 2 MLJ 78. It is plain that he asked himself the right questions and addressed the issues with eminent fairness. He excluded the words "which we took from the shop" which had formed part of the information provided to the police by the second accused on the ground that they did not come within the scope of s. 27 . [32] Based on the evidence led by the prosecution the learned judge held that both accused had a case to answer and called upon each of them to enter upon their defence. We are of opinion that he was entirely correct in his decision. [33] Upon his defence being called the first accused elected to remain silent whereupon the learned judge found him guilty and convicted him on all four charges. His counsel submitted that his client had suffered a procedural injustice as the consequence of his electing to remain silent was not explained to him and as such the conviction could not stand. A careful perusal of the record provided to us shows that after the learned judge had made his order calling for the defence of the first accused, the three alternatives were explained to him. Of course, the record does not spell out each of them. But there is - and never has been - a rule of law or practice imposing such a requirement. What happens in the practice is that in all criminal trials, after defence is called, a clerk of court explains the consequence of each alternative to an accused. This is reflected in the notation "three alternatives explained to the accused" made in the notes of evidence without the judge or magistrates writing down each alternative. This has been the practice since time immemorial. It has worked well and there is no necessity to re-visit or alter it. From the record of appeal it is clear that this practice was adhered to in the proceedings before the learned judge. Accordingly, we are of the view that this