the perception and memory of a person who is dying?)” [See: Waltz, J.R. (1975) Criminal Evidence, Chicago: Nelson-Hall. pp.75-76] 55. The Privy Council in Neville Nembhard v. The Queen reported in (1982) 1 AII ER 183, on Section 32(1) of the Act 1872 opined that the evidence of dying declaration under the Indian law lacks the special quality as in Common Law and hence, the weight to be attached to a dying declaration admitted under Section 32 of the Act 1872 would necessarily be less than that attached to a dying declaration admitted under the common law rules. 56. The below cited observations from the decision of Nembhard (supra) are of significant importance: " final observation should be made concerning the cases al ready mentioned that have been decided in the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa. It appears that rule of practice has been developed that when a dying declaration has been the only evidence implicating an accused person a conviction usually cannot be allowed to stand where there had been a failure to give a warning on the necessity for corroboration: see for example Pius Jasunga s/o Akumu v. The Queen (1954) 21 E.A.C.A. 331 and Terikabi v. Uganda [1975] E.A. 60. But it is important to notice that in the countries concerned, the admissibility of a dying declaration does not depend upon the common law test: upon the deceased having at the time a settled hopeless expectation of impending death. Instead there is the very different statutory provision contained in section 32 (1) of the Indian Evidence Act 1872. That section provides that statements of relevant facts made by a person who is dead are themselves relevant facts: “When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in 27