[2014] 5 MLRA Nachilongo Doreen v. PP 397 NACHILONGO DOREEN v. PP Court of Appeal, Putrajaya Balia Yusof Wahi, Mohtarudin Baki, Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat JJCA [Criminal Appeal No: B-05-157-06-2012 (ZMB)] 20 January 2014 Criminal Law: Dangerous drugs — Trafficking — Proof of case beyond reasonable doubt — Appellant appealed against conviction of trafficking in dangerous drugs — Whether prosecution had made out a prima facie case — Whether there was any gap in prosecution’s case — Whether trial judge applied correct standard of proof at conclusion of trial — Whether appellant’s conviction safe The appellant had been arrested at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport (‘KLIA’) by police personnel on suspicion of trafficking in dangerous drugs. Upon an examination of the appellant’s bag (“the bag”), the police found three packages, which were later confirmed by the chemist to contain methamphetamines. The trial judge found that there was no challenge on the analysis by the chemist that the chain of evidence in respect of the drugs was not broken. Based on all the evidence adduced, the trial judge found the appellant guilty of trafficking in dangerous drugs and that a prima facie case was proven. In her defence, the appellant claimed that the bag was not locked, and that at KLIA, she was detained by the Immigration Authority for about eight hours, before the bag was handed back to her. Having found that the appellant’s defence had not raised a reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case, the trial judge convicted and sentenced the appellant to death. Subsequently, the appellant appealed against her conviction, contending that there was a break in the chain of evidence; and that at the end of the trial, the trial judge had applied the wrong standard of proof. Held (dismissing the appellant’s appeal): (1) There was, on the facts, no evidence to establish that the appellant was in fact detained by the Immigration Authority for eight hours. Looking at the evidence in totality, the prosecution had made out a prima facie case against the appellant and the trial judge had rightly called upon the appellant to enter her defence. In this instance, there was no gap in the prosecution’s case and the trial judge was correct in finding that the appellant had custody and control of the bag. Hence, applying s 37(d) Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (“DDA”), the appellant was presumed to have knowledge of the drugs in the bag. Further, the trial judge was correct in finding that the appellant was trafficking under s 2 DDA where the appellant was found concealing, carrying and transporting the drugs in the bag. (paras 24 & 26)