446 Malayan Law Journal [2010] 4 MLJ … that the functions of an appellate court, when dealing with a question of fact, and a question of fact in which questions of credibility are involved, are limited in their character and scope. In an appeal from a decision of a trial judge based on his opinion of the trustworthiness of witnesses whom he has seen, an appellate court must in order to reverse, not merely entertain doubts whether the decision below is right but must be convinced that it is wrong. [20] The Federal Court cited this passage in Dato Mokhtar bin Hashim v Public Prosecutor. It is also not part of the function of an appellate court to make its own finding of fact. In Public Prosecutor v Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2005] 6 MLJ 393; [2006] 1 CLJ 457, The Federal Court held, (per Gopal Sri Ram, then JCA): Now, it settled law that it is no part of the function of an appellate court in a criminal case or indeed any case-to make its own findings of fact. That is a function exclusively reserved by the law to the trial court. The reason is obvious. An appellate court is necessarily fettered because it lacks the audio visual advantage enjoyed by the trial court. A B C D [21] There must be overriding error in the assessment of the facts or there are blatant errors committed in coming to such findings. In Bear Island Foundation v AG for Ontario (1991) 83 DLR (4th) 381, the Supreme Court of Canada held: E This case, it must be underlined, raises for the most part essentially factual issues on which the courts below were in agreement. On such issues, the rule is that an appellate court should not reverse the trial judge in the absence of palpable and overriding error which affected his or her assessment of the facts. F [22] In Lee Ah Seng & Anor v Public Prosecutor [2007] 6 MLJ 1; [2007] 5 CLJ 1, the Federal Court mentioned the aforesaid passage. And in a more recent case Krishna Rao a/l Gurumurthi v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2009] 3 MLJ 643; [2009] 2 CLJ 603, the Federal Court held, (per Richard Malanjum CJ (Sabah and Sarawak)) observed: G But we take note that in these appeals there had been concurrent findings of fact both by the trial High Court and the Court of Appeal. Thus, as the final appellate court we should be slow in interfering with such findings unless there are blatant errors committed in coming to such findings (see Loh Shak Mow v Public Prosecutor Wong Hoi Ping, Alan v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 362; [1986] 1 LNS 47 (also [1986] SLR 358); Broadhurst v The Queen (PC) [1964] 2 WLR 44. [23] Before considering the next major issue on the element of common intention and decisions of the HC and COA thereon, it is pertinent to H I