[2010] 4 MLJ A B C D E F G H I Low Kian Boon & Anor v Public Prosecutor (Heliliah FCJ) 477 One of the arguments advanced on behalf of the second appellant was that s 34 could only be applied if the common intention of the accused was to commit the offence with which they were charged. In other words, the second appellant could not be found guilty of an offence under s 302 of the Penal Code unless the common intention of the appellants was to cause the death of the deceased, or was such other intention as is mentioned in s 300 of the Code. The court had no difficulty in rejecting this argument and held that s 34 had been properly applied vis-à-vis the second appellant. In Neoh Bean Chye, the first appellant knew that the second appellant had a loaded revolver and that it would be used, if necessary, during the course of the robbery. He himself had loaded the gun and handed it to the second appellant who shot the deceased when he offered resistance during the robbery. The first appellant’s conviction for murder under s 302 read with s 34 of the Penal Code was upheld by the court. On this view, all that it is necessary for the prosecution to prove is that there was in existence a common intention between all the persons involved to commit a criminal act and that the act which constituted the offence charged (the ‘criminal act’ referred to in s 34 of the Penal Code) was committed in furtherance of that criminal act. The rider to this is that the participants must have some knowledge that an act may be committed which is consistent with or would be in furtherance of, the common intention. Support for this approach may be found in the words of Desai J in Bashir v State of Allahabad AIR 1953 All 668 at p 672: These words (‘in furtherance of the common intention’) were added by the Legislature in 1870 and must have been added for a purpose. That purpose could be none other than to make persons, acting in concert, liable for an act, which is not exactly the act intended by them, but has been done in furtherance of their common intention. The words would not have been required at all if the common intention implied an intention to do the very criminal act done. It will be recalled that Lord Sumner had made the same point in Barendra Kumar Ghosh. Applying this test to Neoh Bean Chye, the offence for which the appellants were ultimately charged murder was done in furtherance of their common intention to commit a criminal act (robbery); they also knew that the victim might be shot if he offered any resistance. They were clearly guilty of an offence under s 302 read with s 34 of the Penal Code. A note of caution must be sounded before we move on the second element of s 34. Common intention means a prior meeting of the minds and must be distinguished from same or similar intention. In Mahbub Shah, the appellant and one Wali Shah were out shooting game when they heard shouts for help from one Ghulam Quasim Shah who was being attacked by the deceased, Alla Dad. (Ghulam had tried to get back from Alla Dad the reeds which the latter had unlawfully taken from the lands of Ghulam’s uncle). Wali Shah in trying to rescue Ghulam shot and killed Alla Dad while the appellant injured one Hamidullah Khan. Both the appellant and Wali Shah were convicted under s 302 read with s 34. The Privy Council in allowing the appeal, said that while the appellant and Wali Shah had the same or similar intention to rescue Ghulam by using their guns if necessary, there was no evidence that the killing of Alla Dad was in furtherance of a common intention. Sir Madhavan Nair said at p 121 of the report:

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