State secrets laws classify data regarding national-level approval and execution of death sentences as top-secret, the highest possible level of secrecy.3 China is only one of a small number of countries in which the disclosure of statistics about use of the death penalty is also criminalised. A person that discloses such information may themselves be sentenced to death.4 This creates a culture of secrecy and fear which inhibits domestic debate and reform. Lack of disaggregated data in China means that it is impossible to analyse the demographics of individuals sentenced to death. The Chinese government cannot guarantee that the death penalty does not disproportionately impact economically vulnerable, ethnic minorities, or people with psychosocial or intellectual disabilities. Disaggregated data on gender is also not publicised. It is unclear how the death penalty impacts on women, the proportion of women executed for drug crime, or whether cases involve domestic violence. Chinese legal scholars have called for greater transparency on numbers of death sentences and executions. One Chinese legal scholar, in 2017, called for the number of death sentences and executions to be made public in order to foster public trust in the legal system, reduce wrongful convictions and promote informed debate. 5 This type of open reflection on and criticism of Chinese legal policy comes, however, with risks. In recent years, there have been increased restrictions on freedom of expression online and crackdowns on civil society including NGOs and human rights lawyers. Both individuals and organisations calling for increased transparency and reforms of the death penalty process face harassment and the threat of detention.6 Lack of domestic and international scrutiny Without accurate data on the numbers of individuals sentenced to death and executed it is impossible to assess China’s claims to have implemented legal reforms and reduced the use of the death penalty. In order to reform the death penalty process, the power to review all death sentences with immediate execution was returned to China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) in 2007. Observers widely see this as a significant factor in reducing the number of executions.7 However, as no accurate figures are available this cannot be verified. Accurate and meaningful comparative research on global trends is not possible. In 2009, international NGO Amnesty International stopped publishing its estimated figures on the application of the death penalty in China. They cited concerns over how China was misrepresenting their estimated figures on the death penalty.8 By maintaining secrecy, the Chinese government does not have to face domestic or international scrutiny if death penalty rates change. Were the government to launch another “strike hard” campaign on crime it would not be possible to monitor any increase in the number of executions.9 The Chinese government is able to politicise legal proceedings by keeping the real figures a state secret. The government can suggest to a domestic audience that the rates of execution are high, as a perceived form of deterrent and retribution, while simultaneously hinting to an international audience that the rates are falling.10 For example, every year, Chinese state media reports of death sentences and executions imposed for drug-related offences 3 Human Rights in China (HRIC). “State Secrets: China’s Legal Labyrinth’ Human Rights in China”. 2007. https://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdfs/hric_statesecrets-report.pdf 4 In the 2017 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, articles 111 and 113, a person may be sentenced to death if such a disclosure “causes particularly grave harm to the State and the people or if the circumstances are especially serious”. 5 Duihua. “How Transparency in Death Penalty Cases Can Reduce Wrongful Convictions.” 22 August, 2017. https://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2017/08/how-transparency-in-death-penalty-cases.html 6 Human Rights in China. “Fifth Anniversary of 709 Crackdown: Updated Chart of Persecution of Lawyers and Legal and Rights Advocates.” 9 July, 2020. https://www.hrichina.org/en/fifth-anniversary-709-crackdown-updated-chart-persecution-lawyers-and-legal-and-rights-advocates 7 Xiong, Moulin, and Miao, Michelle. ‘Miscarriage of Justice in Capital Cases in China’. Hastings International & Comparative Law Review, 273342. 2018. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3040537 8 Amnesty International. “Global Report. Death Sentences and Executions. 2019.” 21 April, 2020. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ACT5018472020ENGLISH.PDF 9 Trevaskes, Susan. Policing Serious Crime in China: From “Strike Hard” to “Kill Fewer.” 2010. New York: Routledge. 10 Smith, Tobias. “Body Count Politics: Quantification, Secrecy, and Capital Punishment in China.” Law & Social Inquiry, Volume 45, Issue 3, August 2020, pp. 706 – 727 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/lsi.2020.10 2