[2017] 1 MLJ A B C D E F G H I Michael Philip Spears v Ketua Pengarah Penjara Kajang & Anor and another appeal (Varghese George JCA) 477 result of his incarceration and further the appellant had a serious mental disorder that had been diagnosed to be ‘schizophrenia’. [15] Also on 28 August 2016 we allowed the appellant’s encl 13(a) (Court of Appeal) application, upon being informed that the respondents had no objections thereto, namely, to adduce the medical record of the appellant dated 6 December 2004 from Hospital Bahagia, Ulu Kinta, as additional evidence in respect of the appeals before us. Appeal W-01(IM)(NCVC)-415–10 of 2014 [16] It was our decision that this appeal against the substantive application to strike out the suit, be dealt with first. The sole issue for determination here was whether in law or on the facts, it had been shown that the matters raised or the relief sought by the appellant in the suit were plainly and obviously unsustainable. [17] As evident from the grounds of judgment the learned judge at the High Court approached that issue principally from the perspective of whether the court had any further jurisdiction to entertain and consider the remedies prayed for in the suit after the criminal trial had been concluded and all avenues of appeal had been exhausted, even on the grounds advanced by the appellant that there had been a delay in carrying out or executing the sentence ordered by the court. The learned judge held that the court had no such further powers or jurisdictions to grant any of the relief sought by the appellant in the suit. [18] The learned judge relied on various decided authorities that had upheld the principle that the courts were ‘functus officio’ after completion of the judicial process. Her Ladyship agreed with submissions of senior federal counsel that once a sentence had been handed down and all appeals exhausted, it lay solely within the prerogative of the Ruler of a State and/or Pardons Board whether to grant reprieves and respites by reduction of the sentence (or otherwise), even if it was to be on the grounds that there had been any delay by the authorities in executing the death sentence imposed/affirmed by the courts. The court also referred to art 42 of the Federal Constitution and provisions of s 281 of the Criminal Procedure Code, particularly s 281(a)(ii) thereof in that regard. [19] To be fair to the learned judge, the decision that it was no longer within the powers of the court to order a stay of execution or grant a respite of the sentence was made in the context of the principal ground relied upon by the appellant’s then counsel at the High Court, namely, that there had been a delay in carrying out the hanging ordered and the appellant had been detained in solitary confinement for the inordinate period of over 14 years. Such detention, it had been argued, amounted to inhumane treatment and a violation of the