696 Krishna Rao Gurumurthi & Anor v. PP & Another Appeal [2007] 1 MLRA [8] It must be said for completeness that cautioned statements were recorded from all three accused. They were however excluded from evidence as the learned trial judge held them to be involuntary and inadmissible following a trial within a trial. [9] Based on the totality of the evidence led before him, the learned judge called for the defence of the first and second accused. The first accused remained silent. The second accused gave evidence. At the conclusion of the whole case the learned judge convicted the accused and imposed upon them the mandatory capital sentence. [10] Before us, learned counsel for each accused primarily directed their submissions on the learned judge's decision to admit and act upon the discovery statements made by the accused while in police custody. It was also submitted that the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution was insufficient to sustain the convictions for murder. [11] Let us first deal with the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the body of Balakrishnan. It is in evidence that the first accused was brought before and questioned by PW15 (Inspector Buba Garan) at about 10.25pm on 13 March 1998. Immediately after obtaining the information, PW15 made a police report (exh. P87) at about 11pm. The report is to be found at p. 682 of the appeal record). According to PW15's evidence, the first accused brought the police party by way of the Simpang Pulai toll plaza and then onto the highway heading towards Kuala Lumpur until they reached km 292.4 at which point the first accused then asked the party to stop. When they were on the upper roadside of the highway, the first accused pointed out to the police party a body that was at a well lit area of the highway. PW15 found that it was a body of a man in a sitting position. This was at about 11.55pm. [12] Learned counsel for the first accused attacked the admission of the discovery statement of the first accused on a number of grounds. First, he relied on the fact that the discovery statement had been obtained immediately before the first accused gave his cautioned statement. It was submitted that both statements were part of the same transaction. Since the cautioned statement was held to be involuntary and inadmissible so must the discovery statement. Counsel relied on Goi Ching Ang v. Public Prosecutor [1999] 1 MLRA 26; [1999] 1 MLJ 507; [1999] 1 CLJ 829; [1999] 2 AMR 1297 in support of his submission. In that case, the Federal Court held that s. 27 operated independently of s. 24 so that the requirement of voluntariness which is the essence of the latter provision formed no part the former. This was, however, subject to the overriding discretion of a criminal court to exclude evidence on the ground that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. In other words, evidence that may be tenuous grounds for holding it admissible may nevertheless excluded by a trial judge on the ground of its prejudicial effect. Whether the discretion ought to be exercised in favour of an accused is a matter that depends on the facts of each case. [13] Kesavan v. Public Prosecutor [2002] 2 MLRA 404; [2003] 2 MLJ 209; [2003] 1