444 Malayan Law Journal [2010] 4 MLJ words,… in a case depending on circumstantial evidence, it is enough if the court merely says that it is satisfied of the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without further saying that the facts proved irresistibly point to one and only one conclusion, namely the accused’s guilt (per Suffian LP in Jayaraman & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1982] 2 MLJ 306 at p 310). A B Similarly Mohd Azmi SCJ (as he then was) in Ng Thian Soong v Public Prosecutor [1990] 2 MLJ 148 observed (at p 151): It must be noted at this point since Jayaraman & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1982] 2 MLJ 306, the then Federal Court had applied McGreevy v Director of Public Prosecution [1973] 1 WLR 276, by holding that a trial judge’s direction to the jury on burden of proof is the same whether the prosecution’s evidence is direct or circumstantial, ie proof beyond reasonable doubt. Where the evidence is circumstantial, there is no further duty on the judge as in the past, to direct the jury that the evidence must be such as to be inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion or hypothesis than the guilt of the accused in addition to proof beyond reasonable doubt. C D His Lordship then added at p 151: But be that as it may, these authorities do not relieve the trial judge from the duty to make a balanced direction to the jury on other reasonable inference that could be drawn from any particular circumstantial evidence, particularly where they are equally favourable to the accused. E F Inferences from circumstantial evidence In determining the proper inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court in Ng Thian Soong v Public Prosecutor pointed out as follows (at p 150): G … Where the strands of circumstantial evidence connecting the accused with the crime are capable of more than one inference, it is not sufficient for the trial judge merely to tabulate the indirect evidence. He must go one step further by directing the jury what other reasonable inferences could be drawn from each strand of circumstantial evidence, and leaving it to the jury to decide which inference they wish to adopt. It is only when the combined strength of these inferences accepted by the jury when twisted together is strong enough to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding could be arrived at as to the guilt of the accused. H I