introduced a policy of ‘balancing leniency and severity’, paving the way for the police, prosecutors and lower courts to identify mitigating circumstances that would reduce the number of executions.2 Since Xi Jinping took over the leadership of the Party in 2012, there are, again, indications of a more politicised approach to sentencing, including of foreigners. This has been described as “China’s deaththreat diplomacy.”3 The prominent case of Robert Schellenberg, a Canadian national sentenced to death in December 2018, along with a further three Canadians, appears to be in retaliation for the arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in Canada (see Chapter 1 on Most Serious Crimes for more details on Schellenberg’s case). In May 2014, a ‘strike hard campaign against violent terrorism’ was initiated in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in response to several deadly attacks. A number of executions were announced that year in the far western region.4 Repressive measures in the XUAR have since escalated to the large-scale arbitrary detention of Uyghurs in so-called ‘vocational education and training centres’. Several prominent Uyghurs are reported to have been given two-year suspended death sentences for “separatism” in secret proceedings. These include the President of Xinjiang University, Tashpolat Tiyip. The Chinese authorities have since claimed that he was charged with corruption and had not been sentenced to death; his whereabouts, however, remain unknown (see Chapter 1 for further information on national security offences).5 Chinese legal traditions The People’s Republic of China inherited legal thinking from imperial China as well as efforts by the Republican government, in the early 20th century, to modernise the legal system by importing ideas and practices from Germany, by way of Japan. In many respects, China shares similarities with civil law jurisdictions and has a primarily inquisitorial criminal procedure. Chinese legal scholars have called it a ‘super inquisitorial’ process due to the lack of protection for the suspect.6 The Chinese Constitution does not include the right to life for citizens; despite constitutional protection of a number of fundamental freedoms, including from unlawful detention, the constitution is not justiciable. Legislation is the primary source of law in China. There is no case law. The Supreme People’s Court passed regulations introducing Guiding Cases in 2010 to promote greater consistency in decision-making, but these cases provide limited precedent for the lower courts (see Additional Resources). This has been referred to as a legal precedent system with Chinese characteristics. 7 2 Trevaskes, Susan. “From ‘Killing Many’ to ‘Killing Fewer’” in Liang, Bin and Lu, Hong (eds) The Death Penalty in China: Policy, Practice and Reform, Columbia University Press, 2016. 3 Clarke, Donald. ‘China’s Death-Threat Diplomacy.’ China Collection, 14 January 2019. https://thechinacollection.org/chinas-death-threat-diplomacy/. 4 See, for example, Buckley, Chris. ‘China Says 8 Executed in Western Region; Charges Stem From Separatist Attacks’. The New York Times, 24 August 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/world/asia/8-people-executed-in-xinjiang-onterrorism-charges-china-says.html. 5 Amnesty International R ‘China: Further information: Fears for Uyghur academic demand answers: Tashpolat Tiyip’. ASA 17/2175/2020. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa17/2175/2020/en/ 6 Lan Rongjie. ‘A False Promise of Fair Trials: A Case Study of China’s Malleable Criminal Procedure Law.’ Pacific Basin Law Journal Vol. 27. 2011. 7 Chen, Xingliang. “Guiding Cases for China’s Death Penalty” in in Liang, Bin and Lu, Hong (eds) The Death Penalty in China: Policy, Practice and Reform, Columbia University Press, 2016. 8