680 Balamurali Muthusamy v. PP [2010] 3 MLRA 300. Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder: (a) ... (b) ... (c) ... (d) if the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death, or such injury as aforesaid. [14] In his grounds of judgement the learned judge when applying the above provision of s. 300(d) to the facts wrote: Secara keseluruhannya saya mendapati adalah jelas OYDT dalam keadaan sedar akan perbuatannya dan tahu perbuatan beliau menyalakan pemetik api ketika itu sangat berbahaya kepada beliau dan juga Komathi. Saya juga berpendapat OYDT juga sudah tentu mengetahui perbuatan beliau itu membahayakan kepada Sareswathy yang berada begitu hampir dengan OYDT. [15] With the defence of being intoxicated rejected, the learned judge had gone ahead to clarify that the appellant knew what he was doing at the time of the incident, and knew that his act of striking the lighter was imminently dangerous. Without any merit in his defence he thus had failed to rebut the prosecution's case on reasonable doubt. The learned judge then found the appellant guilty of murder, had him convicted and accordingly sentenced to death. [16] Come the appeal before us learned counsel began by ventilating that the grounds of judgment of the learned judge was not a talking judgment and had fallen short of the requirement of s. 300(d) of the Penal Code . Learned counsel conceded that even though the learned judge had made a factual finding that the appellant's acts were imminently dangerous he failed to conclude whether the act in all probability would cause death. [17] To resolve this allegation a need arises for us to scrutinise the grounds of judgment thoroughly first. Having perused the grounds, with respect we must disagree with counsel's submission. At p. 202 of the record of appeal in no uncertain terms the learned judge, when considering whether a prima facie case had been established, had written that: i. the fire was caused by the appellant; ii. the act of the appellant of drenching the deceased persons with petrol followed by the striking of the lighter was imminently dangerous;