484 Malayan Law Journal [2017] 1 MLJ … A … [78] The above materials, particularly, the directions of the United National International Conventions, of which India is a party, clearly show that insanity/mental illness/schizophrenia is a crucial supervening circumstance, which should be considered by this Court in deciding whether in the facts and circumstances of the case death sentence could be commuted to life imprisonment. To put it clear, ‘insanity’ is a relevant supervening factor for consideration by this Court. … B C [37] The decision in Shatrughan Chauhan was followed in Navneet Kaur’s. Further in Triveniben & Ors it was noted: Since it is well established that Article 21 of the Constitution does not end with the pronouncement of sentence but extends to the stage of execution of that sentence, as already asserted, prolonged delay in execution of sentence has a dehumanising effect on the accused. D Also in Sher Singh v State of Punjab 1983 AIR 465 the Supreme Court of India through Chandrachud CJ held: E The horizons of Art 21 are ever widening and the final word on its conspectus shall never have been said. So long as life lasts, so long shall it be the duty and endeavour of this Court to give to the provisions of our Constitution a meaning which will prevent human suffering and degradation. Therefore, Art 21 is as much relevant at the stage execution of the death sentence as it is in the interregnum between the imposition of that sentence and its execution. The essence of the matter is that all procedure, no matter at what the stage, must be fair, just and reasonable. F [38] Counsel for the appellant had referred to us a number of authorities of similar purport from various jurisdictions but the above observations of the apex court of India in cases where a convicted person was in somewhat similarly circumstanced situation as the appellant is presently, most definitely demonstrate that the contentions of and relief sought by the appellant in the suit were not outright bare and/or frivolous and/or devoid of any arguable jurisprudential basis. It might well be that some of those cases referred may be distinguishable on the facts or on account of the applicable law or procedure involved, or even that the international conventions or customary law cited found not to be relevant for our consideration in the suit, but the appellant ought to, in our view, be allowed to fully ventilate and have those issues judicially determined. As commented in Bandar Builder, ‘… so long as the pleadings disclose some cause of action or raise some questions fit to be decided by the Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed at the trial is no ground for the pleadings to be struck out …’. G H I