478 Malayan Law Journal [2017] 1 MLJ rights enshrined in art 5 of the Federal Constitution, which a prisoner was also entitled to. [20] Before us, there was however a slight shift in the emphasis of submissions for the appellant. It was argued that judicial intervention was warranted as per the relief sought in the suit not merely on grounds of delay in carrying out the hanging but this was to be coupled with the further consideration that the appellant was presently afflicted with a serious mental disorder. It was submitted that the appellant was entitled to the protection of the law even at this stage and in that context the suit did not amount to a challenge on the substantive death sentence that had been imposed at the close of the criminal trial process. [21] The learned judge in allowing the suit to be struck out had essentially relied on the decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal in Jabar v Public Prosecutor [1995] 1 SLR 617. In that case there had been a delay of five years in the disposal of a petition for clemency and a declaration was sought that it would be cruel and inhuman to carry out a death sentence (similar as in our case). The application for a declaration was dismissed by the High Court and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. A B C D E [22] However the reasonings of the court in refusing intervention in Jabar, as could be gleaned were that: (a) the principle derived from the Privy Council decision in Pratt v A-G for Jamaica [1994] 2 AC 1 was not applicable as there was no equivalent s 17(1) of the Jamaican Constitution prohibiting ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’, in the Constitution of Singapore; (b) the Indian authorities on the subject were not helpful as there was material difference between Indian and Singapore criminal procedure in respect of the passing of a death sentence; in India death sentence (limited to six offence) was not mandatory or conclusive and had to be confirmed by the High Court sitting in appeal to the sentencing court (usually the sessions court); F G H (c) once a sentence was passed, the judicial process was concluded and the court was ‘functus officio’; and (d) the power of commutation or remittance of sentence lay only with the President and the plea for clemency was still pending; and (e) anguish and mental agony suffered whilst awaiting execution was an inevitable consequence and did not amount to a contravention of the constitutional rights of the prisoner. I