[2017] 1 MLJ A B C D E F G H I Michael Philip Spears v Ketua Pengarah Penjara Kajang & Anor and another appeal (Varghese George JCA) 481 instructively noted in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36; [1993] 4 CLJ 7: It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule … can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it ‘obviously unsustainable’ … It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or defence … The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claim was frivolous or vexatious or that the defence raised are not arguable. [31] We agreed with counsel for the appellant that the essence of the challenge mounted in the suit was not against the criminal process or the death sentence passed by the court and/or the decision of the Pardon’s Board. We were of the further view, that the complaint here was in respect of and directly arising from the delay in carrying out the death sentence imposed on the appellant, the inhuman and degrading treatment that he had to undergo over sixteen odd years after conviction and more materially, the mental state and condition that he was in presently. This was all about the treatment and rights of a prisoner languishing on death row; such rights definitely did not end with the affirmation of the death sentence by the Federal Court (Smt Triveniben & Ors v State of Gujarat & Ors 1989 AIR 1335) or by the rejection by the Pardons Board of the appellant’s plea for clemency. In other words, being on the death row did not extinguish the appellant’s constitutional rights or remove from the court jurisdiction to at least consider the remedy or relief applied for in the suit. [32] The Federal Court in Lee Kwan Woh has succinctly stated how the courts should act when called to interpret provisions of the Federal Constitution dealing with fundamental liberties generally, and art 5 thereof in particular. They include the following passages and we have taken the liberty to highlight the salient observations relevant for our consideration in this case. [8] In the second place, the Constitution is a document sui generis governed by interpretive principles of its own. In the forefront of these is the principle that its provisions should be interpreted generously and liberally. On no account should a literal construction be placed on its language, particularly upon those provisions that guarantee to individuals the protection of fundamental rights. In our view, it is the duty of a court to adopt a prismatic approach when interpreting the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part II of the Constitution. When light passes through a prism it reveals its constituent colours. In the same way, the prismatic interpretive approach will reveal to the court the rights submerged in the concepts employed by the several provisions under Part II. Indeed the prismatic interpretation of the Constitution gives life to abstract concepts such as ‘life’ and ‘personal liberty’ in art 5(1). There are several authorities in support of this view … [9] The next case is Boyce v The Queen [2004] UKPC 32, where Lord Hoffman said: Parts of the Constitution, and in particular the fundamental rights provisions of