[2007] 1 MLRA Krishna Rao Gurumurthi & Anor v. PP & Another Appeal 697 CLJ 846; [2003] 2 AMR 468 provides an illustration of how the discretion is to be exercised on the facts of a particular case. In that case, the accused was apprehended while carrying two packages which were found to contain a proscribed drug. Despite objection being raised by the defence, evidence was admitted to show that on being accosted the accused fell at the arresting officer's feet and begged for help. The purpose or object of putting in this evidence was to prove that the accused knew that the packages contained the drug in question. It was argued that the evidence was inadmissible as no caution had been administered. But it was not possible for the arresting officer to administer a caution given the circumstances. On appeal this court held that the evidence though technically admissible should have been excluded by the judge in the exercise of his discretion. The conduct of the accused in begging the arresting officer aside, there was ample other evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the requisite knowledge. So evidence of the accused's conduct was merely prejudicial without doing anything to improve the prosecution's case. [14] The facts of the present case are very different and readily distinguishable. Here, the trial judge specifically negatived any oppression having been brought to bear on the accused. After due consideration he accepted the evidence of the police officers on the point and we find his reasoning to be unimpeachable. There is another reason why the point cannot succeed. The probative value of the first accused's discovery statement far outweighed its prejudicial effect in the sense discussed. For, it merely went to establish the first accused's state of mind - a highly relevant fact. It did nothing more. [15] The second ground raised by learned counsel against admitting the discovery statement was this. He submitted that on the prosecution's own evidence it was not the first accused but someone else who had provided the police with information as to the whereabouts of Balakrishnan's body. Counsel said that that is the fair inference to be drawn from the independent facts. In support of his argument learned counsel drew our attention to the police report exh. P87 which is at p. 682 of the record of appeal. According to that exhibit the first accused told PW15: Saya boleh tunjukkan tempat saya buang mayat which when translated into English reads "I can show the place where I threw the body". In a later passage in exh. P87 PW15 states that the first accused told him that he would show the place where he threw the body of the jaga or watchman. Learned counsel also relied heavily on PW15's evidence under cross-examination where he said that what actually happened was that the first accused spoke in Tamil and said that he agreed to show PW15 where he had disposed of a body. It was submitted that the discrepancies in the evidence above supported the inference that the first accused only had knowledge of the whereabouts of a body and not the body of Balakrishnan. It was further submitted that the evidence adverted to merely confirmed the suspicion that the information of the whereabouts of the