[2010] 4 MLJ A B Low Kian Boon & Anor v Public Prosecutor (Heliliah FCJ) 443 evidence of relevant facts, ie facts from which the existence or non-existence of facts in issue may be inferred. It does not necessarily follow that the weight to be attached to circumstantial evidence will be less than that to be attached to direct evidence. For example, the tribunal of fact is likely to attach more weight to a variety of individual items of circumstantial evidence, all of which lead to the same conclusion, than to direct evidence to the contrary coming from witnesses lacking in credibility. The learned editors point out further: C Circumstantial evidence ‘works by cumulatively, in geometrical progression, eliminating other possibilities’ (Director of Public Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729, per Lord Simon at p 758). Pollock CB, likening circumstantial evidence to a rope comprised of several cords, said: D One strand of the cord might be insufficient to sustain the weight, but three stranded together may be quite of sufficient strength. E F G H I Thus, it may be in circumstantial evidence that there may be a combination of circumstances, no one of which would raise a reasonable conviction or more than a mere suspicion but the whole, taken together, may create a strong conclusion of guilt, that is with as much certainty as human affairs can require or admit of (Exall (1866) 4 F & F 922 at p 929). However, although circumstantial evidence may sometimes be conclusive, it must always be narrowly examined, if only because it may be fabricated to cast suspicion on another. For this reason, it has been said that: It is also necessary before drawing the inference of the accused’s guilt from circumstantial evidence to be sure that there are no other co-existing circumstances which would weaken or destroy the inference (Teper v The Queen [1952] AC 480, per Lord Normand at p 489). Nonetheless, there is no requirement, in cases in which the prosecution’s case is based on circumstantial evidence, that the judge direct the jury to acquit unless they are sure that the facts proved are not only consistent with guilt but also inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion (McGreevy v Director of Public Prosecutions [1973] 1 WLR 276). Similar to the English position, it is also now established in Malaysia that in cases where circumstantial evidence is relied upon by the prosecution, the proper test to be applied by the judge trying a case without the jury is for the judge: … to remember only that the prosecution need prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and failure by him to also say that the circumstances are not only consistent with the accused having committed the crime but also such that they are inconsistent with any other reasonable explanation, is not fatal. In other