[2010] 4 MLJ A B C D E F G H I Low Kian Boon & Anor v Public Prosecutor (Heliliah FCJ) 445 His Lordship then concluded (at p 150): Bearing in mind that unlike statutory presumption, there is no shift in the burden of proof on the prosecution where the evidence is circumstantial, it is necessary for the trial judge not to give the impression that there need only be one inference that can be drawn from every circumstantial evidence. The principal circumstantial evidence in the present case are clearly open to more than one reasonable or plausible inference, and failure to put them squarely to the jury would in the circumstances occasion a miscarriage of justice. His Lordship pointed out that it was the duty of the trial judge to make a balanced consideration of other reasonable inferences that could be drawn from any particular circumstantial evidence, particularly where they were equally favourable to the accused. Circumstantial evidence can sometimes be stronger than direct evidence as there is no possibility of it being like a witness’s testimony which may be lacking in truth or accuracy. In circumstantial evidence, the motives or acts speak for themselves, sometimes louder than the words of a witness, without any embellishment. It should also be pointed out that circumstantial evidence does not depend on hypothesis, or theories, or even speculations. They must give rise to strong inferences so as to become the best evidence. [17] At this stage it is also opportune to mention the principles governing appellate intervention, particularly, where in this appeal before us there are concurrent findings on facts bearing in mind that the conviction has been sustained on circumstantial evidence. [18] In the Malaysian context the much publicised case of Dato Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1983] 2 MLJ 232, affords a reminder that has been extolled in the judicial statements of the Federal Court, namely, when the credibility of witnesses are being evaluated the functions of an appellate court, in dealing with a question of fact in which questions of credibility are involved, are limited in their character and scope. In this instant appeal, there are found expressions by the HC judge of his opinion of witnesses whom he has seen and as an appellate court in order to reverse that, this court must be convinced that the trial judge is wrong. [19] The following are some of the judicial decision that reflect the ambit of the powers of an appellate court to interfere with the findings of a trial court. The case of Antonio Dias Caldeira v Frederick Augustus Gray [1936] MLJ 110 at p 110, could first be mentioned. The Privy Council held: